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This paper aims to identify demographic, socio-economic, and health 
determinants on the individual decision of being insured by private coverage. Based 
on the 2015 Korea Health Panel Survey, I applied logistic regression to disclose the 
determinants of holding private health coverages. Secondly, I tried to assess the 
presence of moral hazard by comparing health care utilization between the insured 
and the uninsured. For the same sample, I used a bivariate logistic model to compare 
the propensity of ever-use outpatient and inpatient care over the past year between 
insured and uninsured individuals. I then further studied whether the insured was 
likely to increase total outpatient visits and bed-days more than the uninsured by 
using Poisson regression. 
As a result, the private health insurance system had limitations in providing 
the socially disadvantaged, such as the elderly, the disabled, and low-income class, 
with better access to health care services. Meanwhile, people with doctor-diagnosed 
chronic diseases are more likely to be insured, which means adverse-selection may 
occur in private health insurance market.  
I also found that private health coverage had a statistically significant 
association with both increased access and intensity of use for outpatient treatments. 
However, in terms of hospitalization, I could not find any statistical evidence that 
the insured is more likely to utilize inpatient care. 
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Chapter1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
 The increasing health care expenditure (HCE) has become one of the most 
critical social problems in developed countries, including South Korea. According 
to the OECD health data, the share of health care expenditure in the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of Korea has been increasing faster than average OECD member 
countries. The proportion of Korea’s HCE to GDP has increased by 3.2%p from 2001 
to 2016, while the average of OECD member states’ HCE share in GDP has increased 
only 1.6%p during the same period. What’s more, the increase of the ratio has been 
accelerating in recent several years. According to OECD statistics, the difference of 
Korea’s HCE share in GDP was 0.8%p from 2014 to 2016, while the average change 
of OECD member states was only 0.1%p during the same period. 
 
 
Figure1 Share of health care expenditure in GDP (OECD health data 2017) 
 
 
In the meantime, the coverage ratio of Korean National Health Insurance 
(NHI), the NHI’s expenditure to gross national health care cost, has stayed at about 
63% since 2010. The flat trend means that the incremental economic burden for 
health care utilization has been taken mainly by the individual, other than the public 
safety-net. According to OECD health data, Korea has the second largest ratio of 
out-of-pocket expenditure to total health care cost, next to Mexico, among OECD 
members as of 2014.  
In response to increasing demand for health care and limited coverage ratio 
to increasing medical cost, Korean governments announced new public health 
insurance policy directions to extend the coverage of NHI. The primary purpose of 
new policies is to ensure the NHI covers much broader essential health care services, 
except for plastic surgery and esthetic treatment. According to the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare (MHW), the NHI reform allows essential health care treatments, such 
as MRI and Ultrasonography, to be entitled to the NHI coverage through regular 
reviews on and continuous entitlement for medical treatments uncovered by the NHI. 
Furthermore, the government has re-designed payment structures of the NHI so that 
the socially-disadvantaged have easier access to health care services with a low out-
of-pocket cost. For instance, the NHI’s out-of-pocket cost ratio for the elderly who 
get dental implants has become lowered from 20~50% to 10%. Besides, the NHI 
covers all essential medical supports for pregnant women, including intrauterine 
insemination and in vitro fertilization-embryo transfer. The MHW projected that the 
reform eventually increases the NHI's coverage ratio from 63% to 70% within five 
years and costs approximately 30.6 trillion won by 2022. 
1.2. Korean health insurance system 
The extended public health insurance system is expected to enhance overall 
access to health care, but concurrently, it could entail a substantial financial burden 
to the whole population. According to the National Assembly Budget Office 
(NABO), the fiscal deficit of NHI would reach $14.7 billion in 2022 and $22.1 
billion in 2027, which is increased by $3.7 billion and $9.9 billion, respectively, from 
the previous projection in 2016. The NABO expected that the accumulation of fiscal 
deficit would accelerate along with the rapidly aging population, which eventually 
raises the premium of mandate national health insurance or additional tax payments 
(National Assembly Budget Office, 2017). For the incremental financial deficit of 
NHI, one of the structural reasons pointed out by experts was the moral hazard by 
private insurance holders, which refers to insurance holders’ additional health care 
utilization. Structurally, the NHI, mandate to the whole population, incorporated 
cost-sharing scheme as 5-40% of the total cost for each essential medical treatment 
to prevent moral hazard problem (Ministry of Health and Welfare, n.d.). However, 
the NHI’s cost sharing settings could be ineffective because private health insurances 
overlappingly cover the insurance holders’ out-of-pocket payment of the treatments 
entitled to NHI coverage (Jung et al., 2011). 
Korean private health insurance can be divided into two types: indemnity 
type (IDT) and fixed amount type (FAT). The IDT refers to insurance that covers 
people’s actual medical costs except for its pre-imposed out-of-pocket payment, 
which usually set as some proportion of total expenditure. Meanwhile, FAT refers to 
insurance that provides people with a fixed amount of insurance money for their 
disease or medical service utilization regardless of how much they paid for the 
treatments. Both types cover insurance holders’ out-of-pocket cost for the medical 
treatments, non-covered part by the NHI: the IDT directly curtails the out-of-pocket 
payment ratio of NHI coverage, and the FAT indirectly reduce out-of-pocket costs 
by the fixed insurance money.  
The overlapping coverage has long been pointed out as a significant 
incongruity that emasculates the cost sharing system of the NHI that is supposed to 
prevent moral hazard and causes private insurance owners’ excessive medical 
treatments. Mainly, indemnity health insurance, by which nearly 33 million people 
are insured as of 2016, has been considered as a significant cause of excessive 
medical utilization and fiscal deterioration of the NHI. The Figure2 below describes 
the overall coverage of the NHI and IDT type private insurance. 
 
Figure2 Constitution of national medical cost and coverage of IDT insurance 
 
1.3. Development of government policy 
 In the Korean health management system, the NHI has undoubtedly played 
as a backbone of social safety-net, providing people with essential living standards. 
The NHI, firstly created as health coverage for employees in 1977, has been 
providing the whole population with essential health insurance since 1989. The 
improvement is exceptionally rapid as compared to many other countries with a 
universal public health insurance system. For example, Germany took 127 years to 
settle public health insurance that fully covers the whole nation. Japan took 36 years 
for it (Jung et al. 2018). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
universal public health insurance is categorized by the coverage scope; the NHI 
covering parts of medical services under the ‘Fee-for-Service’ system belongs to a 
complimentary insurance system (Jung et al. 2018). Under the supplementary public 
insurance system with a coverage gap, various new health care services uncovered 
by the NHI emerged as the technological progress in the medical industry. The 
coverage gap for new treatments facilitated private health insurance developments, 
such as indemnity health insurance filling the NHI’s coverage gap in terms of scope 
and scale (Jung et al. 2018). With the rapid changes of health care industry, 
discussions on policy alternatives to supplement the NHI’s low coverage ratio, 61.8 
percent as of 2004, began in earnest (Jung et al. 2018).  
The discussions proceeded from two different perspectives: expanding the 
NHI’s coverage scope and fostering a sound private health insurance industry to 
complement the NHI’s coverage. The former has a limitation in the increase of 
considerable financial burden. Meanwhile, the latter was challenged by concerns that 
private health coverage would not play a complementary role as a social safety-net 
due to structural problems. In 2005, to address the issue, president Noh created the 
presidential committee for health care service developments’, in which many experts 
and relevant governments discussed the strategic policy alternatives for a 
harmonious structure between the NHI and private health insurance market. The 
discussion included the recalibration of the regulatory frameworks for private health 
coverages to supplement the NHI in increasing the access to medical services.  
According to the press release by the prime minister’s office in 2006, the 
committee deliberated and discussed various agenda (as shown in Table1); primary 
examples are as follows. Many experts teased out the private insurers’ cream-
skimming, such as irrationally discriminatory underwriting for the socially 
vulnerable people in health insurance enrollment and turning down consumer’s 
claims without any ground. Notably, the structural incongruity that the indemnity-
type private health coverage without out-of-pocket payment, even for the services 
partially covered by the NHI, caused unnecessary health care utilization and the 
waste of the NHI budget.    
Based on the collective analysis, the committee reviewed various policy 
alternatives and proposed policy recommendations, including: 
 
 Create a regulation for the private health insurance to cover only the medical 
treatments that were not entitled to be insured by the NHI  
 Impose mandatory cost-sharing part on the IDT private health insurances to 
mitigate moral hazard effects  
 Construct the collaborative governance structure to enhance information 
sharing between financial and health authorities.    
Table1 Major issues in 2006 presidential committee for health care industry 
developments 
Objective Status Authority 
Coverage adjustment of IDT private insurance 
: prohibiting IDT from covers the out-of-pocket payment  






Standardization of private health insurance 
: regulating IDT insurance into single structure coverage 
: imposing mandatory deductibles on IDT coverage 
 - imposed 10% deductibles in 2009, 20% in 2013 
: regulating private insurers’ excessive coverage by FAT 
 - limit inpatient benefit under 30 thousand won per day 









Delegating the inspection on private health insurance 
money claim to HIRAS: prevent insurers from wasteful 
insurance dividend 
Suspended HIRAS 
Sharing medical information and insurance statistics 








* Source: committee meeting for medical service developments (2006. 10. 24) and  
* MoF: Ministry of Finance and Economy / FSC: Financial Supervisory Commission 
  HIRAS: Heath Insurance Review and Assessment Service 
NHIS: National Health Insurance Service 
 
Governments have gradually introduced some of them, not all, since 2009, hoping 
that they increase overall access to health care services as well as enhance the NHI 
more cost-effective.  
 In academia, a variety of studies have also discussed government policy 
options for the harmonious structure between public and private health insurance 
systems. Lee et al. (2011) suggested that the government should control private 
health coverage from the perspective of public health enhancement. They argued that 
governments regulate private insurers to develop health coverages specified for the 
socially vulnerable classes and regulate private health insurance to uncover the out-
of-pocket payments set by the NHI. Kim et al. (2012) argued that governments 
should reform the public health insurance system so that the NHI benefits are 
concentrated on the socially vulnerable in the rapidly aging society; furthermore, for 
the rest, the policy on the private health insurance market should focus on expanding 
various opportunities for people to choose to cover their health risks. They also 
emphasized that governments should adjust the cost-sharing system to prevent the 
insured from excessive use of health care services, and concurrently develop 
incentive mechanism to increase the insurance holders’ effort to stay healthy.  
Jung et al. (2018) introduced policy alternatives from the study on foreign 
health insurance system. They argued that the private health insurance system should 
be a supplementary social safety net for the NHI’s financial sustainability. One of 
the most critical policies should be enhancing the accessibility of socially vulnerable 
class to private coverage by mitigating private insurers’ cream-skimming. Besides, 
governments should consider various incentive mechanisms for private health 
coverage to play as a supplementary social safety-net. According to Jung et al. (2018), 
Australia prohibits private insurers from rejecting health coverage enrollment by law 
and regulates them to provide coverage for their entire life. Besides, it has an income-
based rebate system to refund some of the insurance premiums for private health 
coverage to motivate people to purchase individual health coverage and the 
disincentive scheme that imposes additional insurance premiums for those who are 
insured by private health coverage after the age of 30. 
 
 
1.4. Research Purpose 
 This paper’s primary purpose is to provide empirical grounds to draw 
policy implications for the long-term development of the national health insurance 
system. Firstly, this paper will disclose socio-economic determinants that 
significantly affect the propensity of holding additional private health insurance to 
universal public insurance, NHI. This examination shows whether regulatory 
policies have been effective in enhancing the private health insurance market to 
become a complementary social safety-net for the socially underserved and sheds 
light on what the relevant authorities should consider in developing public and 
private health insurance policies. For example, if the elderly have been suffering 
from being covered by the private insurance market due to private insurer’s cream-
skimming, the NHI should develop unique public insurance programs to provide 
them with affordable lifetime health care services by resolving market failure. 
The analysis will also show whether regulatory changes in cost-sharing 
systems, for instance, mandating private health insurers to set 10~20% of total 
payments as out of pocket costs, have come to be effective in reducing excessive 
healthcare utilization. The comparison of the health care utilization between those 
with private coverages and otherwise provides the financial authority with policy 
grounds for long-term private health insurance industry reform. For example, the 
FSC should extend the out-of-pocket payment of Indemnity health insurance and 
reorganize its overlapping coverage with the NHI for the long-term fiscal soundness 
of NHI. Along with the coverage adjustments, governments should activate the 
“InsureTech” to incentivize private insurers to differentiate insurance premiums by 
insurance holders’ effort to maintain or enhance their health. Finally, this study also 
fills the periodical gap between previous literature and recent when various 
institutional changes have been made.  
 
 




2.1 Moral hazard and Self-selection 
 
In the health care market with intrinsic information asymmetry, moral 
hazard and self-selection have been recognized as major contributors to market 
failure (Hsiao WC., 1995; Wong et al., 2010; Park & Jeong, 2011). The moral hazard 
mainly refers to "the distortion in consumer demand for health services because of 
the insured's lower out-of-pocket payments by insurance than otherwise" (Wong et 
al., 2010). The self-selection refers to the phenomenon, "where only the sick would 
choose to be insured," so-called adverse-selection, and "where oppositely the 
insurers would select only the lowest risk individuals for coverage," so-called 
advantageous-selection (Wong et al., 2010).  
 The Moral hazard is theoretically divided into two types of behavioral 
distortions: ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard (Zweifel et al. 2000). The ex-ante 
moral hazard refers to the insured individual's reduction of preventive effort in 
response to insurance coverage on health care service. On the other hand, the ex-post 
moral hazard is an increase in the demand for medical services because the insured 
takes lower out of pocket payments at point-of-care, thereby encouraging the 
additional use of services than otherwise. According to Zweifel et al. (2000), the 
former is barely proved and has limited empirical evidence, while the latter has been 
proved empirically in many cases (Zweifel et al. 2000). Accordingly, this paper focus 
on studying the ex-post moral hazard. 
 In theory, moral hazard by private health insurance can cause harmful 
effects on the fiscal soundness of NHI (Park et al. 2011). People with additional 
private coverage face lower out-of-pocket costs than those covered by only the NHI, 
and as a result, they have an incentive to increase the use of medical services. 
Eventually, the additional use of health care services would increase the NHI’s 
expenditure of insurance money for medical treatments entitled to be covered by the 
NHI. In a nutshell, the overlapping coverage of private health insurance emasculates 
the deductible settings imposed by the NHI to prevent moral hazard effects, thereby 
narrowing down the long-term policy room for the socially disadvantaged. 
 The self-selection is the flip-side phenomenon of moral hazard in the health 
care market. The actual realization of self-selection differs from markets by the 
relative extent between adverse and advantageous selection. For example, in the 
private health insurance system in which insurance companies strongly screen out 
individuals with high health risk by meticulous and strict underwriting criteria, the 
advantageous selection is stronger than adverse selection. Self-selection makes the 
empirical study on the moral hazard complicated. That's because inappropriate 
modelling and insufficient consideration of self-selection to the empirical model 
would overestimate or exaggerate the moral hazard effect of private health insurance 
(Savage E et al. 1989). That is because if people who have a higher risk of using 
health care service purchased private insurances, the relatively more use of health 
services would not have been caused by moral hazard but by the adverse selection. 
Therefore, in the empirical estimation and interpretation of the moral hazard effect, 
it is essential to control the self-selection clearly. 
 
2.2 Empirical studies on health care system 
 
Studies on foreign health care systems 
Various empirical studies examined the health care system based on 
country-specific survey data. Early research that dealt with the Medicare, US 
national health insurance program providing health coverage for Americans aged 65 
and older, and Medigap, private health insurance plans satisfying criteria imposed 
by US government authorities showed different results about whether there exists a 
difference in the use of medical treatments between the policyholders and otherwise. 
The difference in health care expenditure between private insurance purchaser and 
otherwise in those studies has shown to be ranged from 0% to 30~40% in health care 
utilization (Link et al., 1980; McCall et al., 1991; Chulis et al., 1993; Christenson et 
al., 1997; Khandker et al., 1999; Atherly, 1999). However, not only did these studies 
provide unclear evidence on the difference caused by the Moral hazard effect, but 
they also did not incorporate the self-selection clearly in their empirical model. 
         The empirical studies on health insurance and medical utilization in the 
2000s considered self-selection issues in their model. Buchmueller et al. (2004) and 
Salib & Ventelou(2007) analyzed the determinants of French private health 
insurance based on national survey ESPS conducted in 1998. France has partial 
public health insurance with private payments accounting for about 25% of all health 
care expenditures. In the study, the employment, income level, and tobacco 
consumption were statistically significant in determining the propensity to hold 
private health insurance. In contrast, health-related factors such as ‘self-assessed 
health status’ were shown to be insignificant factors on the individual decision to be 
covered by private insurance. Moreover, they found that individuals with 
supplemental private coverage are likely to use more physician visits than those with 
only public programs.  
        Sapelli & Vial(2004), who analyzed the Chilean health care system using 
the 1996 CASEN survey, a biannual National Socioeconomic Survey, assessed the 
self-selection and moral hazard of dependent employees and independent workers. 
In Chile, the former mandatorily choose between public health insurance or private 
insurance, while the latter voluntarily chose whether they are insured or not. 
According to Sapelli et al. (2004), independent workers who have a high risk of 
health care utilization are more likely to be insured by private and public insurance 
(Adverse selection), and by which they used more health care services (Moral 
Hazard).  
On the other hand, for dependent workers, insurers screened, the adverse-
selection was present against public insurance based on observable variables (by 
insurers and researchers), but not present against private insurance. That’s because 
private insurance has risk-adjusted premiums to screen out the high risk of using 
health services. However, the differentiated price policy did not prevent the moral 
hazard for physician visits while did in hospitalization days. They concluded that 
insignificance of moral hazard in hospitalization is due to the low price elasticity of 
demand for it. 
         Irene O.L. et al. (2010) measured moral hazard and adverse selection in 
the mixed health care system of HongKong by propensity scoring method. They 
analyzed the data derived from a Thematic Household Survey in 2005, 
commissioned by the Food and Health Bureau. In their empirical analysis, they 
divided health insurance into three types, self-purchased (SB), employment-based 
(EB), and welfare-associated public benefits (WB), and categorized medical service 
suppliers into two types, public medical institution and private one. According to 
their study, in the use of public medical institutions, there was no moral hazard effect 
and adverse selection. However, for the use of private hospitals, EB and WB cause 
more utilization of outpatient and inpatient services, but the SB significantly 
increased the propensity in ever use of outpatient service in private institutions. 
Additionally, SB does not affect the number of outpatient visits, ever use of inpatient 
service, and bed-days.  
         As we can see above researches on different health care systems, the 
presence of moral hazard and self-selection varies from country to country. In 
addition to the above studies, there exist many other empirical studies, such as King 
& Mossialos (2005), that figured out determinants of private health insurance in the 
UK with free medical services and Holly (1998) that tested the existence of self-
selection in Switzerland.  
 
Studies on the Korean health care system 
There exist some empirical studies that analyzed the Korean health care 
system, which was getting active since 2008. However, they showed different 
conclusions about this issue. Jung et al. (2006) tried to find the difference between 
private insurance holders and those without private coverage for the use of outpatient 
and inpatient services. They analyzed 620,534 claims by 33,342 people with 
additional private coverages and 225,011 claims by 66,602 people without private 
insurances. They estimated the effects of private health insurance on outpatient visits 
and spending, inpatient days and spending, and concluded that it only significantly 
increased outpatient visits and spending. However, this research has some limitations. 
Firstly, it did not model self-selection in the empirical estimation and not control 
significant socio-demographic variables suggested in many international studies. 
The second limitation was that the OLS regression on count data applied in his paper 
would be biased because the number of outpatient visits and of bed-days are not 
continuous variables but count data. Finally, data used in the analysis are from only 
two major insurance companies as of 2001 because of the lack of public data (Yoon 
2008).  
         On the other hand, Yoon (2008) reached different conclusions about the 
determinants of private health insurance and the difference in health care utilization 
between private insurance holders and otherwise. It analyzed medical treatment 
claims enrolled in Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service (HIRAS) from 
2004 to 2006 by matching them with individual socio-economic data subtracted from 
the NHI database and private health insurance information from 45 insurers. In her 
study, she concluded that income-level does not affect the propensity for individuals 
to be insured privately (self-selection. Furthermore, no substantial difference was 
observed in the use of health care services. This study has some limitations, including 
improperly controlled self-selection problem in the analysis model (Park et al. 2011).  
         After the Korea Health Panel survey (KHP) data constructed in 2008, 
Park et al. (2011) analyzed KHP data collected for the 1st half of 2008 to find 
empirical evidence of the moral hazard. Its conclusion, which contradicted Yoon’s 
research in some aspects, was that low-income class, the elderly, the disabled, the 
unemployed, and people with chronic disease are less likely to be covered by private 
insurance. Furthermore, due to private insurance companies’ intense screening 
process on people with a high risk of medical utilization, an advantageous selection 
by unobserved factors was shown to be stronger than adverse selection. Lastly, it 
concluded that private insurance holders are more likely to ever use outpatient 
services than otherwise.  
         This study also has some limitations as follows from current perspectives. 
First of all, it did not empirically analyzed inpatient services and the outpatient 
counts. Secondly, the data used in the study did not reflect the outcome of regulations 
introduced to relieve the moral hazard of private insurance since 2009. The 3rd point 
was that it did not control some critical health factors, which was proved to be 
statistically significant in previous literature, such as self-assessed health status and 
smoking habits. 
 




 This study analyzes the Korea Health Panel (KHP) data in 2015. The KHP 
survey, in which the sample was stratified by region, has been conducted by the 
National Health Insurance Service and the Korea Institute for Health and Social 
Affairs since 2008. This nationwide survey annually measures the various 
demographic and socio-economic status of nearly 4,642 household and its 18,130 
members (as of 2015), including whether them to be insured by private health 
insurance, its coverage type, their ever use of outpatient and total visits, ever use of 
inpatient service and total bed-days, and health-related lifestyle factors. To analyze 
individual decision of health coverage enrollment and health care utilization, this 
study focuses on 14,099 subjects aged over 18 and used their health-related habits, 
such as self-perception on their health status, information of diagnosed chronic 
diseases, smoking status as tools to control potential self-selection effect.  
         By the way, analysis of this type of panel data requires careful 
consideration of sample consistency data in addressing subjects' private health 
insurance information, because the little consistency in health insurance holding 
status makes it hard to apply pooling methods to the analysis. According to the Korea 
Insurance Development Institute, the cumulative ratio of canceling private health 
insurance within three years from the initiation reaches almost 40% on average from 
2008 to 2017. For instance, the 3rd year cancelation ratio of private health coverage 
sold by life insurance companies, which is an average during past ten years, is 40.3% 
in whole life insurance, 38.8% in cancer benefits, 41.0% in long-term care insurance, 
36.2% in critical illness benefits and 32.1% illness insurance. Also, the cumulative 
3rd year cancellation ratio of insurance sold by general insurance companies is 34.7% 
in accident insurance, 38.1% in illness insurance, 44.9% in long-term care insurance. 
This high cancellation may be indicative of inconsistency in individuals’ status of 
being covered by private health insurance. 
Given above high cancellation ratios, even though it did not consider 
insurance transfers, analyzing KHP data by pooling method may not be valid due to 
possible inconsistency in data set. Therefore, this paper adopted the year-by-year 
regression analysis on the KHP survey to acquire concrete and reasonable results. 
Figure 3 Cumulative cancelation ratio of private health insurance 
3.2 Model and Methodology 
 
(1) Logistic Regression: determinants of private health 
insurance 
 
 To find determinants of individual decision to hold additional private health 
insurance, I used the multivariable logistic regression model. I assumed that the 
choice of holding private health insurance depends on the difference in individual 
utility between holding health insurance and otherwise, and the utility is determined 
by socioeconomic, demographic, and health-related variables. Following equations 
demonstrates the process, in which  is individual net utility, Yi is whether to hold 
private health insurance or not during the past 1 year, and the error term follows the 
logistic distribution.  
 In this model, independent variables consist of socio-economic and 
demographic factors, such as household income, sex, age, the presence of spouse, 
education level, employment status, residential region, the special clauses of the NHI, 
the disabilities, a chronic disease. For improvements from the previous literature 
analyzing the KHP, this paper additionally controlled various health needs factors, 
such as self-assessed health status, smoking habits, and intake of health supplements.  
 
(2) Self-selection and moral hazard in health care service 
utilization  
 
(2)-1 Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Logit with Endogeneity  
 
 To assess private insurance purchasers’moral hazard, I applied ‘Seemingly 
Unrelated Bivariate Logistic Regression with Endogeneity (SUR with endogeneity)’ 
to model ever use of outpatient episodes and hospitalization.  
 
                  (2) 
  
 
           (3) 
  
    
In equation (2) modeling individual decision of health insurance holding, 
Y*1i is the difference of individual utility between individual insurance holding and 
otherwise, and Y1i is whether individuals hold private health insurance. In equation 
(3) modeling individual decision of health care service utilization, Y*2i is the 
difference in utility between when an individual to use outpatient or inpatient and 
when not to so. Y2i is whether an individual has ever used outpatient or inpatient 
within the past one year. The error terms of equation (2) and (3) follow the logistic 
distribution. 
To minimize residual confounding by the self-selection in the comparison 
of the medical service utilization between the private insurance holders and 
otherwise, numerous objective and subjective health-related variables, such as 
doctor-diagnosed chronic disease, smoking status, intake of health supplements, and 
age were controlled in the regression model (Wong et al., 2010).  
Given the self-selection by uncontrolled variables that those with high 
health risk are more likely to be insured, the coefficients of equation (2) and (3) were 
simultaneously estimated and the correlation between error terms of equation (2) and 
(3) was tested by a likelihood-ratio method (LR test). When the null hypothesis of 
zero correlation between error terms is rejected, it implies the propensity of holding 
private health coverage is associated with health care service utilization. It implies 
the presence of self-selection by the unobserved(uncontrolled) factors, which is 
indicate of the relative size of adverse selection and advantageous selection 
(Chiappori and Slanie, 1997; Park et al., 2011). 
 
(2)-2 The total count of outpatient visit and bed-days 
 
 The next step to measure the moral hazard of private insurance holders is 
comparing the total outpatient visits and total bed-days among ever users of them. 
This empirical analysis is testing whether private health insurance holders are likely 
to visit hospitals more often or hospitalize themselves longer than otherwise. To 
empirically analyze this type of moral hazard, I used the Poisson regression method 
that models total outpatient visits and total bed-days within the past year among ever 
users of them. Equation (5) is a Poisson regression whose link function is a natural 
log.  
 
           (5) 
 ε ~ Poisson distribution whose mean and variance is exp(Xβ) 
 
3.3 Variable definition 
 
 Table2 shows definition of independent variables and basic statistics on 
them. It shows proportion of individual with private health insurance according to 
independent variables, including socio-economic and health-need factors.  
Table2 Specific definition of independent variables and descriptive statistics 
Variables Category 
Private Insurance Holder  
Total Insured % No-insured % 
Socio-economic and demographic variables 
Income level (Quintile)  
 1(low) 657 31.7% 1,413 68.3% 2,070 
 2 1,604 62.0% 983 38.0% 2,587 
 3 2,245 75.2% 742 24.8% 2,987 
 4 2,623 82.6% 551 17.4% 3,174 
 5(high) 2,822 86.0% 459 14.0% 3,281 
Education Level  
 Mid. School 2,314 50.7% 2,249 49.3% 4,563 
 High school 3,266 76.9% 983 23.1% 4,249 
 College attend 4,371 82.7% 916 17.3% 5,287 
Gender   
 Female 5,386 71.2% 2,174 28.8% 7,560 
 Male 4,565 69.8% 1,974 30.2% 6,539 
Spouse   
 Spouse 7,176 74.9% 2,408 25.1% 9,584 
 no spouse 2,775 61.5% 1,740 38.5% 4,515 
Working status  
 Dep. Worker 4,519 82.1% 984 17.9% 5,503 
 Indep. Worker 1,575 75.8% 502 24.2% 2,077 
 Unpaid worker 384 66.2% 196 33.8% 580 
 Unemployed 3,473 58.5% 2,466 41.5% 5,939 
Disabled   
Disabled 415 42.5% 561 57.5% 976 
 Normal 9,536 72.7% 3,587 27.3% 13,123 
Additional Public Welfare  
 Add. Support 181 31.0% 402 69.0% 583 
 Noraml 9,770 72.3% 3,746 27.7% 13,516 
Residence   
 Metropolitan 6,474 73.5% 2,331 26.5% 8,805 
 Urban 3,477 65.7% 1,817 34.3% 5,294 
Health-related Variables 
Chronic disease  
 No Chronic 4,232 81.1% 985 18.9% 5,217 
 Chronic 5,179 58.3% 3,163 35.6% 8,882 
Health supplement taken  
 No Taking 1,021 67.0% 504 33.0% 1,525 
 Taking 8,930 71.0% 3,644 29.0% 12,574 
Smoking Status  
 Never smoker 6,343 72.1% 2,450 27.9% 8,793 
 Ever smoker 1,773 64.3% 984 35.7% 2,757 
Current smoker 1,835 72.0% 714 28.0% 2,549 
Subjective health valuation  
Bad 1,350 50.9% 1,304 49.1% 2,654 
Normal 4,050 71.5% 1,618 28.5% 5,668 
Good 4,551 78.8% 1,226 21.2% 5,777 
Total  9,951 70.6% 4,148 29.4% 14,099 
First of all, income level is defined by the quintile based on household 
income where the individual belongs to, and the total amount of household income 
is calculated by the sum of its members’ earned income, such as wage and salary, 
and their all kinds of asset income, including financial interest, real estate, and 
dividend from social insurance. The education variable is categorized by three levels, 
under middle school graduation, high school graduation, and college attendance. 
         Working status is defined to categorize four distinctive groups: employee 
(dependent workers), independent workers, unpaid family business workers, and 
unemployed. The reason for the distinction between dependent and independent 
workers is that the former possibly are expected to utilize less health care service 
than the latter due to their restricted working schedule by their employers. Gender, 
spouse, disability, residence are also controlled in the model. Lastly, the metropolitan 
in the residence variable includes 9 districts: Seoul, Gyeonggi-Do, Pusan, Incheon, 
Gwangju, Daejeon, Ulsan, Daegu, and Sejong.  
         The additional public welfare variable refers to whether an individual is 
entitled to be exempted fully or partially from taking the deductibles of the NHI by 
government welfare programs. The entitled suffering from poverty or intractable 
chronic illness does not have to pay out-of-pocket costs for health care treatments.  
         I fitted both subjective and objective health-related variables to the model. 
The chronic disease variable refers to whether an individual has been diagnosed with 
chronic disease by a certified physician up to date. The subjective health valuation 
variable shows the level of self-assessed health status. Two kinds of lifestyle habit 
were also controlled in the model: whether an individual to take any health 
supplements, such as vitamin, and the smoking status. The reason why I separately 
categorized the ever smoker was to control reverse causality problem: I controlled 
ever smoker group, in which people who forcibly quit smoking due to health 




4.1 The determinants of private health insurance purchase 
 
Table3 shows the result of multivariable logistic regression for the decision 
to hold private health coverages. It suggests odds ratios along with estimated 
coefficients of each categorical group to the benchmark, which means the relative 
probability of people in each group to be insured by self-purchased private coverage 
to the benchmark group. As a result of logistic regression, most demographic, socio-
economic, and health risk variables have a statistically significant influence on the 
probability of individual decision to hold private health insurance, except for the 
residential area. The possible reason why residential does not affect the decision can 
be the fact that the developments of on-line insurance system lowered physical 
barriers for the people in a rural area to be insured.  
From the estimates and odds ratios of income quintile variable, I could find 
that the relative probability to be insured by private health coverage was negatively 
correlated with the level of household income. The 5th quintile group had three times 
higher likelihood of being insured than the 1st quintile group, which means that 
private health insurance has had an intrinsic limitation to play a pivotal social safety-







Table3. Result of logistic regression  
Variables Estimate Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio 
Intercept  -2.4615 <.0001 0.0850 
Income level (Quintile)    
 1(low)    
 2 0.5409 <.0001 1.7180 
 3 0.7752 <.0001 2.1710 
 4 1.1150 <.0001 3.0500 
 5(high) 1.2528 <.0001 3.5000 
Education Level    
 Mid. Graduate    
 High Graduate -0.1807 0.0051 0.8350 
 College attend -0.0712 0.3437 0.9310 
Age  0.1289 <.0001 1.1380 
Age square  -0.0017 <.0001 0.9980 
Gender     
 Female    
 Male -0.3781 <.0001 0.6850 
Spouse     
 With Spouse    
 No spouse -0.5289 <.0001 0.5890 
Working status    
 Dep. Worker    
 Indep. Worker 0.2583 0.0004 1.2950 
 Unpaid worker -0.3597 0.0019 0.6980 
 Unemployed -0.1433 0.0116 0.8670 
Disabled     
 Disabled    
 Normal 0.3904 <.0001 1.4780 
Additional Public Health Welfare    
 Add. Support    
 Normal 0.6540 <.0001 1.9230 
Residence     
 Metropolitan    
 Rural area -0.0384 0.4148 0.9620 
Chronic disease    
 No Chronic    
 Chronic 0.3534 <.0001 1.4240 
Health supplement taken    
 No Taking    
 Taking 0.2293 0.0018 1.2580 
Smoking Status    
 Never smoker    
 Ever smoker 0.2571 0.0004 1.2930 
 Current smoker 0.2131 0.0048 1.2380 
Subjective health evaluation    
 Bad    
 Normal 0.3135 <.0001 1.3680 
 Good 0.4106 <.0001 1.5080 
* Seoul, GyeongGi-Do, Pusan, Incheon, Gwangju, Daejeon, Ulsan, Daegu and Sejong 
For the square of age, the elderly who usually tend to be at health risk could 
not be sufficiently covered by private insurances, which can imply private insurance 
firms have excluded them from their coverage through in-advance screening or 
incremental premium according to age. This differentiation in the private health 
insurance market implies that public health insurance should play more roles for the 
low-income class in response to the rapidly aging in our society. The results provide 
solid grounds for recent comprehensive reform in the NHI to provide deeper and 
broader benefits to the low-income class. 
The empirical result also shows that the disabled were less likely to be 
insured by private health coverage than otherwise. The substantially low probability 
for people with disabilities to be additionally insured implies that the private 
insurance market has alienated the socially disadvantaged from stable health care 
treatments, which requires for government to enhance public programs for them and 
to legally prohibit discriminating them from private coverage only for their physical 
challenges.  
Another critical factor in the probability of being insured by private 
coverage is health-related variables. As shown in Table3, people suffering from 
chronic diseases had a lower propensity to be additionally insured. Given the fact 
that people with a chronic disease have a high risk of getting medical care, the result 
implies that there exists adverse-selection (in insurers’ shoes) concerning objective 
health status. In other words, the underwriting process by private insurers has not 
sufficiently screened out people with high health risks. The result provides the 
financial authority with grounds for new policies to manage incremental insurance 
money expenditure by activating ‘InsureTech (Insurance + Technology)’ or newly 
developing health-promoting insurance products. According to the Financial 
Services Commission, Korean top financial authority, health-promoting insurance 
has become a new breed of insurance product that offers economic benefit, such as 
discounts on the insurance premium, based on policyholders’ efforts to stay healthy 
- such as walking, quitting smoking, and regular physical checks using of 
information technology. As of now, the information technology helps private insurers 
manage ex-post insurance holder’s risk even when they cannot fully screen them in 
advance.  
For individual precautionary efforts to manage their health, two conflicting 
effects have been observed. Current smokers are likely to be insured with higher 
probability than never smokers, which means that there exists an adverse-selection 
in the private health insurance system under the hypothesis that smoking deteriorates 
individual health increasing health care utilization. On the other hand, people taking 
health supplements showed a higher probability of being covered by private health 
insurance, which means that there exists advantageous-selection. 
 
4.2 Comparison of outpatient care utilization between the 
insured and uninsured individuals 
 
4.2-(1) Analysis on ever use of outpatient care  
 
Table4 shows the result of SUR with endogeneity for the ever use of 
outpatient. The system regression, simultaneously estimating equation (2) and (3) by 
maximum likelihood estimation method as explained in section 3.2, has been iterated 
until when only statistically significant variables with at least 90% confidence level 
remain in the equation model. 
Table4. Result of seemingly unrelated bivariate logit regression 
Variables Ever use of Outpatient Private Health Ins. 
  Est. P-value Est. P-value 
Intercept  -0.3093  0.0628  -0.9224  <.0001 
Private Insurance     
 Non-Insured     
 Insured 1.3450  <.0001   
Income level (Quintile)     
 1(low)     
 2 -0.2387  0.0004  0.3377  <.0001 
 3 -0.3020  <.0001 0.4803  <.0001 
 4 -0.2825  0.0001  0.6667  <.0001 
 5(high) -0.2299  0.0019  0.7545  <.0001 
Education Level     
Under High school     
 High Graduate   -0.1003  0.0057  
 College attend   -0.0435  0.2941  
Age  -0.0169  0.0071  0.0682  <.0001 
Age square 0.0004  <.0001 -0.0009  <.0001 
Gender      
 Female     
 Male -0.2992  <.0001 -0.2071  <.0001 
Spouse      
 No spouse     
 Spouse   0.3673  <.0001 
Working status     
 Dep. Worker -    
 Indep. worker -0.0720  0.1098  0.1426  0.0004  
 Unpaid worker 0.1417  0.1658  -0.1956  0.0034  
 Unemployed 0.0900  0.0165  -0.0843  0.0083  
Additional Public Welfare     
 Normal     
 Special exception   -0.3399  <.0001 
Residence      
 Metropolitan     
 Rural area 0.0567  0.0657    
Chronic disease     
 No Chronic     
 Chronic 0.8292  <.0001 0.2086  <.0001 
Supplement food taken     
 Taking     
 No Taking -0.1317  0.0243  -0.1184  0.0043  
Smoking Status     
 Current smoker     
 Ever smoker 0.2448  <.0001 0.1248  0.0026  
 Never smoker 0.2404  <.0001 0.1111  0.0101  
Subjective health evaluation     
 Bad     
 Normal   0.2208  <.0001 
 Good   0.2467  <.0001 
Ρ -0.5426 <.0001   
  Likelihood-ratio test of rho     H0 : rho=0 / rejected 
First of all, from the likelihood ratio test on rho, the correlation coefficient 
between error terms of two equations suggested at the end of the table4, I found that 
the advantageous selection by uncontrolled factor is stronger than the adverse 
selection effect by uncontrolled factors in the relationship between being covered by 
private health insurance and ever use of outpatient service. According to Chiappori 
et al. (1997) and Fabbri (2004), the statistically significant non-zero correlation 
between error terms implies the presence of self-selection bias caused by some 
unobservable factors, and the negative correlation implies that the advantageous 
selection effect surpasses the adverse selection effect. In a nutshell, the people with 
lower propensity to ever use outpatient services were more likely to be insured by 
private coverage. One of the possible explanations on the net advantageous selection 
is that insurance companies have strong screening criteria in their underwriting 
procedures. Under the dominance of advantageous selection by uncontrollable 
factors, the people with additional private health coverage demonstrated a higher 
probability to ever utilize outpatient care than the people with only NHI coverage.  
Another notable result of the simultaneous estimation is the influence of 
income and age on the probability of being insured by private health coverage and 
of ever using outpatient. Under the 3rd quintile of income class, as the household 
income level increased, the propensity to ever use outpatient service increased, while 
their probability of being insured decreased. Furthermore, the elderly with a low 
likelihood of being protected by private insurance, on the contrary, showed a higher 
propensity ever to use outpatient. In a nutshell, these results imply that the private 
health insurance market has failed to give better accessibility to health care services 
to the low-income class and the elderly, so the public welfare programs for them 
should be implemented further.  
For the working status, the unemployed showed a higher propensity to 
utilize outpatient than current workers, regardless of current workers’ income. In 
terms of the residential area, people living in rural areas show a high propensity ever 
to use outpatient treatments. Moreover, women are likely ever to use outpatient as 
well as to be insured by private coverage than men. For the health-related variables, 
the tendencies of being covered by private insurance and of ever using outpatient 
treatments have shown in the same way. Distinctively people with more than one 
choric disease are more likely to use outpatient treatments and concurrently are four 
times more likely to be covered by self-purchased private insurance, which implies 
managing insurance holders’ chronic disease would be a critical issue for private 
insurance companies. 
 
4.2-(2) Analysis on the outpatient visits and health insurance 
 
 Further study on moral hazard with respect to outpatient was to examine 
whether the insured individuals are likely to increase their total outpatient visits than 
otherwise. I implemented Poisson regression to model the number of total outpatient 
visits among ever users of outpatient treatments, i.e., conditional on ever use. 
Because the outpatient visit is a count variable, the estimates of the OLS method 
could be biased, inefficient, and inconsistent (Long 1997). Accordingly, I applied 
Poisson regression based on the maximum likelihood method rather than the OLS 
method.  
         Table5 shows the result of Poisson regression to model the total 
outpatient visit during the last one year. The sample size was 12,196, the number of 
ever users of outpatient. The sample mean was 21, with a standard deviation of 27. 
The table5 also suggests the incident rate ratio (IRR), which implies the expected 
frequency changes by IRR times compared to the benchmark group. As found in the 
table, most variables such as demographic, socio-economic, and health-related 
factors were statistically significant except for the variable of whether an individual 
to live with a spouse or not. 
Table5 Result of Poisson regression on total outpatient visit 
Description on outpatient visits : sample size = 12,196 
Sample mean : 20.99 / Sample s.d. : 27.11 
Variables Estimate Wald  Chi-Square P-value IRR 
Intercept 1.0103 1469.17 <.0001  
Private Insurance     
 Insured     
 Non-Insured -0.0255 25.51 <.0001 0.975 
Income level (Quintile)     
 1(low)     
 2 0.0447 40.56 <.0001 1.046 
 3 0.0682 95.1 <.0001 1.071 
 4 0.0997 202.63 <.0001 1.105 
 5(high) 0.0763 102.9 <.0001 1.079 
Education Level     
Under Highschool     
 High Graduate 0.0623 90.29 <.0001 1.064 
 College attend 0.1847 661.53 <.0001 1.203 
Age  0.039 1599.1 <.0001 1.040 
Age square  -0.0002 622.87 <.0001 1.000 
Gender      
 Male     
 Female 0.1355 396.09 <.0001 1.145 
Spouse      
 No spouse     
 Spouse -0.0088 3.08 0.0792 0.991 
Working status     
 Dep. worker     
 Indep. worker -0.1187 164.6 <.0001 0.888 
 Unpaid worker -0.1226 351.89 <.0001 0.885 
 Unemployed -0.1611 862.47 <.0001 0.851 
Additional Public Welfare     
 Normal     
Special exception 0.1835 584.26 <.0001 1.201 
Disabled      
 Normal     
 Disabled 0.0943 227.03 <.0001 1.099 
Residence      
 Metropolitan     
 Rural area -0.0676 265.03 <.0001 0.935 
Chronic disease     
 No Chronic     
 Chronic 0.6264 7416.95 <.0001 1.871 
Supplement food intake     
 Taking     
 No Taking 0.0968 306.15 <.0001 1.102 
Smoking Status     
Current smoker     
 Ever smoker 0.1871 643.44 <.0001 1.206 
 Never smoker 0.1254 235.3 <.0001 1.134 
Subjective health evaluation     
 Bad     
 Normal -0.282 3440.88 <.0001 0.754 
 Good -0.4412 5855.66 <.0001 0.643 
From the Poisson regression on total outpatient visits, I found the presence 
of insurance holders’ moral hazard on outpatient visits. The entire outpatient visits 
of the non-insured over the last one year are 0.975[=exp(-0.0255), incident rate ratio] 
times the total visits of the insured. Given the sample mean, 20.99, the insured visit 
hospital for outpatient treatments nearly 0.5 days (count) more per year than the non-
insured. 
         For the income level, the total outpatient visit increases as the income-
level increases up to the 4th quintile. As the age increase, the total outpatient visits 
are shown to decrease, although it is slow. The total outpatient visits of the disabled 
are 1.1 times normal people; the total outpatient visit of metropolitan residents is 
1.07 times that of rural residents.  
         In terms of health-related variables, the total outpatient visit of those 
having a chronic disease is 1.9 times otherwise. The better the self-evaluated health 
status, the less frequently people visit a hospital. The ever smoker group utilizes 
outpatient most often, which may be accounted for by the reverse causality that some 
significant proportion of them has involuntarily quitted smoking due to their bad 
health. In addition, never smokers visit hospitals more than the current smoker group 
for outpatient treatments. The possible explanation for the result may be that they 
tend to utilize outpatient services in a precautionary manner to stay healthy.  
 
4.3 Comparison of inpatient care utilization between the 
insured and uninsured individuals 
 
 Table6 and Table7 show the results of bivariate logistic regression and 
Poisson regression on the relationship with private health coverage and the use of 
hospitalization. From those results, for the use of inpatient services, I could not find 
statistically significant proof of the presence of a moral hazard.  
 In the multivariate logistic regression, insured individuals are less likely 
ever to be hospitalized (as shown in table6). On the contrary, I found the presence of 
adverse selection by ‘controllable variables’, such as chronic disease. Also, the 
likelihood ratio test (LR test) shows a statistically significant positive correlation 
between the propensity of being covered and the probability ever to use inpatient 
services, which means the presence of adverse selection by uncontrolled factors. 
Given these two conflicting results, it is difficult to see individuals with private 
coverage tend to use inpatient treatments more than those without private coverage.  
 Furthermore, the Poisson regression was applied to the sample of people 
who have ever used inpatient treatments in order to measure the intensity of moral 
hazard. As shown in table7 below, I could not find any empirical proof on the 
hypothesis concerning whether the insured tends to prolong the period of being 
hospitalized.  
This result can be interpreted by some possible explanations. First, the use 
of inpatient care is strongly affected by the health care suppliers (Wong et al., 2010). 
One of the prerequisites to occur moral hazard in hospitalization is that individuals 
can decide whether or not to and how long to be hospitalized. However, when the 
use of inpatient care and bed-days substantially depends on the doctors’ medical 
decision, the individual decision to use inpatient care may not be affected by private 
health coverage. According to Wong et al. (2010), they found statistical evidence of 
the moral hazard in the use of private outpatient and inpatient care, but they did not 
in the use of public hospital care. Second, the FSC’s regulation on the private insurers 
that limits the fixed insurance money for the bed-days to 30,000 won per day, 
implemented since 2010, could be effective. The regulation might increase the out-
of-pocket cost for hospitalization, thereby lowering the incentive to ever use more 
inpatient treatments. The examination of these aspect needs to be further studied. 
Table6.  Result of SUR on ever use of inpatient care 
 
Variables Ever use of Inpatient Private Health Ins. 
  Est. P-value Est. P-value 
Intercept  -1.2029  <.0001 -1.4787  <.0001 
Private Insurance     
 Non-Insured     
 Insured -0.8632  <.0001   
Income level (Quintile)     
 1(low)     
 2 0.0800  0.1033  0.3303  <.0001 
 3 0.1078  0.0448  0.4755  <.0001 
 4 0.1395  0.0138  0.6629  <.0001 
 5(high) 0.1524  0.0083  0.7475  <.0001 
Education Level     
Under High school     
 High Graduate   -0.0888  0.0128  
 College attend   -0.0199  0.6273  
Age  0.0093  0.2356  0.0821  <.0001 
Age square -0.0001  0.2045  -0.0011  <.0001 
Gender      
 Male     
 Female 0.0994  0.0006  -0.1647  <.0001 
Spouse      
 No spouse     
 Spouse 0.2094  <.0001 0.2931  <.0001 
Working status     
 Dep. Worker - -   
 Indep. worker 0.0414  0.3238    
Unpaid worker 0.0676  0.3126    
 Unemployed 0.1395  <.0001   
Disabled      
 Normal     
 Disabled   -0.2450  <.0001 
Additional Public Welfare     
 Normal     
Special exception   -0.4350  <.0001 
Residence      
 Metropolitan     
 Rural area 0.1298  <.0001   
Chronic disease     
 No Chronic     
 Chronic 0.3091  <.0001 0.1853  <.0001 
Health supplement taken     
 Taking     
 No Taking -0.0720  0.0766  -0.1291  0.0018  
Smoking Status     
Current smoker     
 Ever smoker   0.1278  0.0016  
 Never smoker   0.1216  0.0039  
Subjective health evaluation     
 Bad     
 Normal   0.2545  <.0001 
 Good   0.3391  <.0001 
Ρ 0.5504 <.0001   
 Likelihood-ratio test of rho    H0 : rho=0 / rejected 
 
 
For the income quintile, the propensity to ever use inpatient services also 
increased with the increase of household income level (as shown in table6). On the 
other hand, the bed-days increase with household income level only under the 3rd 
quintile, while the 4th and 5th quintile group has been hospitalized longer than 1st 
and 2nd quintile, which can be along with the explanation that the people with higher 
income would pay higher opportunity costs for their bed-days. 
Moreover, Table6 and table7 show the female is more likely to be 
hospitalized than male, but their bed-days is shorter than male. The people with a 
spouse showed a higher propensity ever to use inpatient than otherwise, and people 
in a rural area have a higher probability of being hospitalized than metropolitan 
residents.  
For the health-related factors, as shown in table6 and table7, people with 
chronic diseases are more likely ever to use inpatient and to stay longer in the 
hospital than otherwise. Besides, current smokers’ bed-days to be hospitalized was 
higher than never smokers’ probability to be hospitalized longer. 
 
Table7.  Result of Poisson regression on total bed-days
Description on bed-days : sample size = 1,869 
Sample mean : 9.72 / Sample s.d. : 14.94 
Variables Estimate Wald  
Chi-Square 
P-value IRR 
Intercept 1.6716 260.97  <.0001  
Private Insurance     
 Insured     
 Non-Insured 0.1681 77.00  <.0001 1.1831 
Income level (Quintile)     
 1(low)     
 2 0.0531 5.78  0.0162 1.0545 
 3 0.1549 40.79  <.0001 1.1675 
 4 0.0799 8.94  0.0028 1.0832 
 5(high) 0.0252 0.78  0.3777 1.0255 
Education Level     
Under Highschool     
 High Graduate -0.3101 216.36  <.0001 0.7334 
 College attend -0.3261 140.94  <.0001 0.7217 
Age  0.0327 84.62  <.0001 1.0332 
Age square -0.0003 89.24  <.0001 0.9997 
Gender      
 Male     
 Female -0.0532 4.18  0.0409 0.9482 
Spouse      
 No spouse     
 Spouse -0.1655 85.79  <.0001 0.8475 
Working status     
 Dep. worker     
 Indep. worker -0.1380 23.81  <.0001 0.8711 
 Unpaid worker -0.0886 4.81  0.0283 0.9152 
 Unemployed 0.1849 73.44  <.0001 1.2031 
Disabled      
 Normal     
 Disabled 0.0883 16.13  <.0001 1.0923 
Residence      
 Metropolitan     
 Rural area 0.1312 72.29  <.0001 1.1402 
Chronic disease     
 No Chronic     
 Chronic 0.0648 5.66  0.0174 1.0669 
Supplement food taken     
 Taking     
 No Taking -0.0406 3.55  0.0595 0.9602 
Smoking Status     
 Current smoker     
 Ever smoker -0.0549 4.68  0.0306 0.9466 
 Never smoker -0.0887 9.23  0.0024 0.9151 
Subjective health evaluation     
 Bad     
 Normal -0.3000 283.02  <.0001 0.7408 





This study has a couple of limitations. First, this analysis cannot assure the 
moral hazard causes the difference in health care utilization between the insured and 
uninsured. The survey-based data cannot distinguish the moral hazard from supplier-
induced demand, which might overestimate the effect of a moral hazard if it exists 
(Wong et al., 2010). The data used in the analysis does not include the information 
on what made each outpatient and inpatient visit; thus, it could mislead the effect 
sizes between health care needs and utilization.  
Second, the estimation of the effect of health insurance by propensity score 
method might be biased, as the probability of being insured by private coverage 
depends on observed and unobserved co-variables. According to Wong et al. (2010), 
unobservable confounding differences could bring an imbalance between the insured 
and uninsured. Even though I controlled significant health need variables, such as 
age, doctor-diagnosed chronic disease, smoking status, self-assessed health status, 
and intake of health supplements, potentially causing self-selection for purchasing 
insurance coverage as many as possible to minimize the effects by residual 
confounding, I cannot completely rule out the possibility that many uncontrollable 
variables, such as family history of certain ailments and genetic factors, that brings 
the adverse selection.   
 
5.2 Conclusion: policy implications 
 
From the empirical analysis of socioeconomic determinants on the 
probability of having private health insurance, the underserved members of society, 
such as the elderly, low-income class, the unemployed, and the disabled, are shown 
to be less likely to be additionally insured by private health coverage. The result 
implies that the private health insurance market has played a limited role as a social 
safety net in providing them with better access to health care services. Besides, 
individuals with chronic diseases were more likely to purchase additional health 
coverages.  
 People with additional private health insurance are shown to be more likely 
to use outpatient care. With various healthcare needs factors being controlled, 
individuals with additional private insurance are shown to have a higher propensity 
ever to use outpatient services. Also, insurance holders’ total outpatient visits were 
higher than otherwise. Nevertheless, the results cannot assure the moral hazard 
causes the more utilization of individuals with both the NHI and additional private 
health coverage. The self-selection in the health insurance system, as mentioned in 
the acknowledgment, possibly occurs by various unobservable factors.  
Meanwhile, for the use of inpatient care, I could not find any statistical 
evidence that those with additional private health coverage tend to use more inpatient 
care. Individuals with additional private insurance did not have a higher probability 
of ever being hospitalized than otherwise. Also, the total bed days of those with 
private coverage were not larger than otherwise.  
These results provide various policy implications. First, governments 
should develop various public programs to provide socially vulnerable groups with 
better access to health care services under the current environment where the private 
health insurance market is limited to be a social safety-net for them. For example, 
governments can expand the NHI’s coverage and adjust the cost-sharing scheme 
more favorable for the underserved group, such as low-income class, preemptively. 
Along with the increased public welfare, the FSC should facilitate private insurers 
to develop well-designed health coverage targeted to the elderly and those with 
ailments. Instead of rejecting insurance subscriptions from the socially vulnerable, 
private insurers should provide health coverages specified for them with a reasonable 
coverage scope and accurate pricing on their risk. This private coverage would be 
useful for those who are old and sick but afford the insurance premium, and as a 
result, it can supplement NHI’s financial capacity.    
Second, to get long-term fiscal soundness of the NHI, governments and 
public agencies continue to examine and adjust the structural inharmony between 
public and private health insurance. Through the collaboration and information-
sharing among health and financial authorities, the NHI and HIRAS, private insurers, 
and experts, governments should focus on figuring out the specific type of outpatient 
care services that private insurance holders substantially use more. Based on the 
findings, governments should impose effective regulations that increase the out-of-
pocket payments on private insurances in order to mitigate the NHI’s excessive 
expenditure.  
Notably, HIRAS and private insurance companies should actively share 
information and resources for a closer analysis of medical services that are newly 
covered by the NHI. That is because in-advance analysis of the treatments that are 
supposed to be included in the NHI coverage helps governments build foundations 
in setting the priority of entitlements and well-balanced cost-sharing systems that 
can prevent excessive use of medical services. The analysis can be done only under 
the close collaboration between HIRAS and private insurers: the HIRAS has 
exceptional expertise in assessing insurance claims and analyzing health care data; 
private insurers has accumulated information on the use of medical treatments 
uncovered by the NHI. Putting the resources together can lead to an effective and 
efficient implementation of new public health policies.  
Finally, the financial authority should develop incentive mechanisms in the 
regulatory framework over private insurances that motivate insurance holders to 
make an effort to stay healthy. For example, financial authorities should set new rules 
on health-promoting insurances that offer economic benefits, such as discounts on 
the insurance premium, based on policyholders’ efforts to stay health – such as 
quitting smoking, regular physical checks, and physical exercises. The new breed of 
health insurance products has been recently powered by technological progress over 
the world. According to Vlaev et al. (2019), a substantial portion of large employers 
and health insurers are already actively adopting various financial incentives for 
healthy behaviors. The United States administration issued a rule for using financial 
rewards or disincentives for workers worth up to 50% of the insurance premium 
(Vlaev et al., 2019). This new insurance pricing scheme is expected to reduce the 
wasteful spending of the NHI as well as enhance public health by mitigating the side 
effect of adverse selection in the private health insurance market.
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